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Abstract—This paper considers three inter-related adver-
sarial inference problems involving cognitive radars. We
first discuss inverse tracking of the radar to estimate the
adversary’s estimate of us based on the radar’s actions
and calibrate the radar’s sensing accuracy. Second, using
revealed preference from microeconomics, we formulate
a non-parametric test to identify if the cognitive radar
is a constrained utility maximizer with signal processing
constraints. We consider two radar functionalities, namely,
beam allocation and waveform design, with respect to
which the cognitive radar is assumed to maximize its utility
and construct a set-valued estimator for the radar’s utility
function. Finally, we discuss how to engineer interference
at the physical layer level to confuse the radar which
forces it to change its transmit waveform. The levels of
abstraction range from smart interference design based on
Wiener filters (at the pulse/waveform level), inverse Kalman
filters at the tracking level and revealed preferences for
identifying utility maximization at the systems level.
Index Terms—Inverse Tracking, Smart Interference, Re-
vealed Preference, Constrained Utility Maximization,
Kalman filter, Bayesian Inference, Physical Layer Inter-
ference, Adversarial Inference, Radar Signal Processing
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive sensors are reconfigurable sensors that opti-
mize their sensing mechanism and transmit functionali-
ties. The concept of cognitive radar [11], [24], [25], [18]
has evolved over the last two decades and a common
aspect is the sense-learn-adapt paradigm. A cognitive
fully adaptive radar enables joint optimization of the
adaptive transmit and receive functions by sensing (esti-
mating) the radar channel that includes clutter and other
interfering signals [5], [16].
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A. Objectives
This paper addresses the next step and achieves the
following objectives schematically shown in Figure 1.
The framework in this paper involves an adversarial
signal processing problem comprising “us” and an “ad-
versary”. “Us” refers to an asset such as a drone/UAV
or electromagnetic signal that probes an “adversary”
cognitive radar. Figure 2 shows the schematic setup. A
cognitive sensor observes our kinematic state xk in noise
as the observation yk. It then uses a Bayesian tracker
to update its posterior distribution pik of our state xk and
chooses an action uk based on this posterior. We observe
the sensor’s action in noise as ak. Given knowledge
of “our” state sequence {xk} and the observed actions
{ak} taken by the adversary’s sensor, we focus on the
following inter-related aspects:
1. Inverse tracking and estimating the Adversary’s
Sensor Gain. Suppose the adversary radar observes our
state in noise; updates its posterior distribution pik of
our state xk using a Bayesian tracker, and then chooses
an action uk based on this posterior. Given knowledge
of “our” state and sequence of adversary’s actions {ak}
observed in noise, how can the adversary radar’s poste-
rior distribution (random measure) be estimated? We will
develop an inverse Bayesian filter for tracking the radar’s
posterior belief of our state and present an example
involving the Kalman filter where the inverse filtering
problem admits a finite dimensional characterization.
A related question is: How to remotely estimate the
adversary radar’s sensor observation likelihood when it
is estimating us? This is important because it tells us
how accurate the adversary’s sensor is; in the context of
Figure 2 it tells us, how accurately the adversary tracks
our drone. The data we have access to is our state (probe
signal) {xk} and measurements of the adversary’s radar
actions {ak}. Estimating the adversary’s sensor accuracy
is non-trivial with several challenges. First, even though
we know our state and state dynamics model (transition
law), the adversary does not. The adversary needs to
estimate our state and state transition law based on
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2our trajectory; and we need to estimate the adversary’s
estimate of our state transition law. Second, to compute
the maximum likelihood estimate of the adversary’s
sensor gain, we require inverse filtering.
Fig. 1: Schematic illustrating the main ideas in the
paper. The three components on the right are inter-
related and constitute the sense-learn-adapt paradigm of
the observer (“us”) reacting to a reactive system such as
the cognitive radar.
2. Revealed Preferences and Identifying Cognitive
Radars. Suppose the cognitive radar is a constrained
utility maximizer that optimizes its actions ak subject to
physical level (Bayesian filter) constraints. How can we
detect this utility maximization behavior? The actions ak
can be viewed as resources the radar adaptively allocates
to maximize its utility. We consider two such resource
allocation problems, namely,
• Beam Allocation: The radar adaptively switches its
beam while tracking multiple targets.
• Waveform Design: The radar adaptively designs
while ensuring the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) exceeds a pre-defined threshold.
Nonparametric detection of utility maximization behav-
ior is the central theme of revealed preference in mi-
croeconomics. A remarkable result is Afriat’s theorem:
it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a
finite dataset to have originated from a utility maximizer.
We will develop constrained set-valued utility estimation
methods that account for signal processing constraints
introduced by the Bayesian tracker for performing adap-
tive beam allocation and waveform design respectively.
3. Smart Signal Dependent Interference. We now con-
sider the adversary radar choosing its transmit waveform
for target tracking by implementing a Wiener filter to
maximize its signal-to-clutter-plus-noise ratio (SCNR1).
By observing the optimal waveform chosen by the
radar, we will develop a smart strategy to estimate the
adversary cognitive radar channels followed by signal
dependent interference generation mechanism to confuse
the adversary radar.
1The terms SCNR and SINR (signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio)
are used interchangeably in the paper and refer to the same quantity.
B. Perspective and Related Work
The adversarial dynamics considered here fits natu-
rally within the Air Force Office of Scientific Research
(AFOSR) Dynamic Data Driven Applications Systems
(DDDAS) paradigm. The adversary’s radar senses, adapts
and learns from us. In turn we adapt sense and learn from
the adversary. So in simple terms we are modeling and
analyzing the interaction of two DDDAS. In this context
this paper has three major themes schematically shown in
Figure 1: inverse filtering which is a Bayesian framework
for interacting DDDAS, inverse cognitive sensing which
is a non-parametric approach for utility estimation for
interacting DDDAS, and interference design to confuse
the adversarial DDDAS.
This paper generalizes and contextualizes our recent
work [27], [23] which only deal with specific radar
functionalities. However, in this paper, we view the
cognitive radar as a holistic system operating at various
stages of sophistication and devise inference strategies
for all such stages. From a problem formulation point
of view, inverse tracking, identifying cognition and de-
signing interference are important inter-related aspects
of adversarial radar signal processing, as schematically
shown in Figure 1. The three components complement
one another and constitute this paper’s adversarial signal
processing sense-learn-adapt paradigm.
In inverse tracking we focus mainly on the inverse
Kalman filter and illustrate in carefully chosen examples
how the sensor accuracy can be estimated. In identifying
cognition, we show that if a cognitive radar optimizes
its waveform to maintain its SINR above a threshold,
then we can identify the utility function of the radar.
Finally, we show that by intelligently probing the radar
with interference signals and observing the changes in
the radar’s waveform, we can confuse the adversary’s
radar by decreasing its SCNR.
This work is also motivated by the design of counter-
autonomous systems: given measurements of the actions
of an autonomous adversary, how can our counter-
autonomous system estimate the underlying belief of the
adversary, identify if the adversary is cognitive (con-
strained utility maximizer) and design appropriate prob-
ing signals to confuse the adversary. The eventual goal
is to predict future actions and therefore guard against
these actions. Specifically, [28] places counter unmanned
autonomous systems at a level of abstraction above the
physical sensors/actuators/weapons and datalink layers;
and below the human controller layer.
II. INVERSE TRACKING AND ESTIMATING
ADVERSARY’S SENSOR
This section discusses inverse tracking in an adversarial
system schematically illustrated in Figure 2. Our main
3ideas involve estimating the adversary’s estimate of us
and estimating the adversary’s sensor observation likeli-
hood.
A. Background and Preliminary Work
We start by formulating the problem which involves two
entities; “us” and “adversary”. With k= 1,2, . . . denoting
discrete time, the model has the following dynamics:
xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0
yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk)
pik = T (pik−1,yk)
ak ∼ Gpik,a = p(a|pik)
(1)
Let us explain the notation in (1):
• xk ∈ X is our Markovian state with transition
kernel Pxk−1,x, prior pi0 and state space X .
• yk is the adversary’s noisy observation of our state
xk; with observation likelihood Bx,y.
• pik = p(xk|y1:k) is the adversary’s belief (posterior)
of our state xk where y1:k denotes the observation
sequence y1, . . . ,yk. The operator T in (1) is the
classical Bayesian optimal filter
T (pi,y)(x) =
Bx,y
∫
X Pζ ,xpi(ζ )dζ∫
X Bx,y
∫
X Pζ ,xpi(ζ )dζdx
(2)
Let Π denote the space of all such beliefs. When
the state space X is finite, then Π is the unit X−1
dimensional simplex of X-dimensional probability
mass functions.
• ak denotes our measurement of the adversary’s
action based on its current belief pik. The adversary
chooses an action uk as a deterministic function of
pik and we obtain a noisy measurement of uk as ak.
We encode this as Gpik,ak , the conditional probability
of observing action ak given the adversary’s belief
pik.
Figure 2 displays a schematic and graphical representa-
tion of the model (1). The schematic model shows “us”
and the adversary’s variables.
Aim: Referring to model (1) and Figure 2, we address
the following questions in this section:
1) How to estimate the adversary’s belief given mea-
surements of its actions (which are based on its
filtered estimate of our state)? In other words, as-
suming probability distributions P,B,G are known,
we aim to estimate the adversary’s belief pik at each
time k, by computing posterior p(pik | pi0,x0:k,a1:k).
2) How to estimate the adversary’s observation kernel
B, i.e its sensor gain? This tells us how accurate the
adversary’s sensor is.
From a practical point of view, estimating the adversary’s
belief and sensor parameters allows us to calibrate its
accuracy and predict (in a Bayesian sense) future actions
of the adversary.
Related Works. In our recent works [30], [31], [29],
the mapping from belief pi to adversary’s action a
was assumed deterministic. In comparison, our proposed
research here assumes a probabilistic map between pi and
a and we develop Bayesian filtering algorithms for esti-
mating the posterior along with MLE algorithms for θ .
Estimating/reconstructing the posterior given decisions
based on the posterior is studied in microeconomics
under the area of social learning [10] and game-theoretic
generalizations [4]. There are strong parallels between
inverse filtering and Bayesian social learning [10], [22],
[21], [20]; the key difference is that social learning aims
to estimate the underlying state given noisy posteriors,
whereas our aim is to estimate the posterior given noisy
measurements of the posterior and the underlying state.
Recently, [19] used cascaded Kalman filters for LQG
control over communication channels.
B. Inverse Tracking Algorithms
How to estimate the adversary’s posterior
distribution of us?
Here we discuss inverse tracking for the model (1).
Define the posterior distribution αk(pik) = p(pik|a1:k,x0:k)
of the adversary’s posterior distribution given our state
sequence x0:k and actions a1:k. Note that the posterior
αk(·) is a random measure since it is a posterior distribu-
tion of the adversary’s posterior distribution (belief) pik.
By using a discrete time version of Girsanov’s theorem
and appropriate change of measure2 [13] (or a careful
application of Bayes rule) we can derive the following
functional recursion for αk (see [27])
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∫
ΠBxk+1,ypik ,pi αk(pik)dpik∫
ΠGpi,ak+1
∫
ΠBxk+1,ypik ,pi αk(pik)dpik dpi
(3)
Here ypik,pi is the observation such that pi = T (pik,y)
where T is the adversary’s filter (2). We call (3) the
optimal inverse filter since it yields the Bayesian poste-
rior of the adversary’s belief given our state and noisy
measurements of the adversary’s actions.
Example: Inverse Kalman Filter
We consider a special case of (3) where the inverse filter-
ing problem admits a finite dimensional characterization
in terms of the Kalman filter. Consider a linear Gaussian
state space model
xk+1 = Axk +wk, x0 ∼ pi0
yk =C xk + vk
(4)
2This paper deals with discrete time. Although we will not pursue it
here, our recent paper [26] uses a similar continuous time formulation.
This yields interesting results involving Malliavin derivatives and
stochastic calculus.
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Fig. 2: Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem. Our side is a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal that probes
the adversary’s cognitive radar system.
where xk ∈X = IRX is “our” state with initial density
pi0 ∼ N(xˆ0,Σ0), yk ∈ Y = IRY denotes the adversary’s
observations, wk ∼ N(0,Qk), vk ∼ N(0,Rk) and {wk},
{vk} are mutually independent i.i.d. processes. Here,
N(µ,C) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ
and covariance matrix C.
Based on observations y1:k, the adversary computes
the belief pik = N(xˆk,Σk) where xˆk is the conditional
mean state estimate and Σk is the covariance; these are
computed via the classical Kalman filter equations:3
Σk+1|k = AΣkA′+Q
Sk+1 =CΣk+1|kC′+R
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1(yk+1−C Axˆk)
Σk+1 = Σk+1|k−Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1CΣk+1|k
(7)
The adversary then chooses its action as a¯k = φ(Σk) xˆk
for some pre-specified function4 φ . We measure the
adversary’s action as
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + εk, εk ∼ iid N(0,σ2ε ) (8)
The Kalman covariance Σk is deterministic and fully
determined by the model parameters. Hence, we only
need to estimate xˆk at each time k given a1:k,x0:k to
estimate the belief pik = N(xˆk,Σk). Substituting (4) for
yk+1 in (7), we see that (7), (8) constitute a linear
Gaussian system with unobserved state xˆk, observations
ak, and known exogenous input xk:
xˆk+1 = (I−ψk+1C)Axˆk +ψk+1vk+1+ψk+1Cxk+1
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + εk, εk ∼ iid N(0,σ2ε )
where ψk+1 = Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1
(9)
3For localization problems, we will use the information filter form:
Σ−1k+1 = Σ
−1
k+1|k +C
′R−1C, ψk+1 = Σk+1C′R−1 (5)
Similarly, the inverse Kalman filter in information form reads
Σ¯−1k+1 = Σ¯
−1
k+1|k +C¯
′
k+1R¯
−1C¯k+1, ψ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1C¯′k+1R¯
−1. (6)
4This choice is motivated by linear quadratic Gaussian control where
the action (control) is chosen as a linear function of the estimated state
xˆk weighed by the covariance matrix
ψk+1 is called the Kalman gain.
To summarize, our filtered estimate of the adversary’s
filtered estimate xˆk given measurements a1:k,x0:k is
achieved by running “our” Kalman filter on the linear
Gaussian state space model (9), where xˆk,ψk,Σk in (9)
are generated by the adversary’s Kalman filter. There-
fore, our Kalman filter uses the parameters
A¯k = (I−ψk+1C)A, F¯k = ψk+1C, C¯k = φ(Σk),
Q¯k = ψk+1ψ ′k+1, R¯ = σ
2
ε
(10)
The equations of our inverse Kalman filter for estimating
the adversary’s estimate of our state are:
Σ¯k+1|k = A¯kΣ¯kA¯′k + Q¯k
S¯k+1 = C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1+ R¯
ˆˆxk+1 = A¯k ˆˆxk + Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1S¯
−1
k+1
×[ak+1−C¯k+1 (A¯kxˆk + F¯kxk+1)]
Σ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1|k− Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1S¯−1k+1C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|k
(11)
Note ˆˆxk and Σ¯k denote our conditional mean estimate
and covariance of the adversary’s conditional mean xˆk.
The computational cost of the inverse Kalman filter is
identical to the classical Kalman filter, namely O(X2)
computations at each time step.
Remarks:
1) As discussed in [27], inverse Hidden Markov model
(HMM) filters and inverse particle filters can also be
derived to solve the inverse tracking problem. For
example, the inverse HMM filter deals with the case
when pik is computed via a Hidden Markov model
(HMM) filter and the estimates of the HMM filter
are observed in noise. In this case the inverse filter
has a computational cost that grows exponentially
with the size of the observation alphabet.
2) A general approximation solution for (3) involves
sequential Markov chain Monte-Carlo (particle fil-
tering). In particle filtering, cases where it is possi-
ble to sample from the so called optimal importance
function are of significant interest [32], [8]. In in-
verse filtering, our paper [27] shows that the optimal
5importance function can be determined explicitly
due to the structure of the inverse filtering problem.
Specifically, in our case, the “optimal” importance
density is pi∗ = p(pik,yk|pik−1,yk−1,xk,ak). Note that
in our case
pi∗ = p(pik|pik−1,yk) p(yk|xk,ak)
= δ
(
pik−T (pik−1,yk)
)
p(yk|xk)
is straightforward to sample from. There has been
a substantial amount of recent research in finite
sample concentration bounds for the particle filter.
In future work such results can be used to evaluate
the sample complexity of the inverse particle filter.
C. Estimating the Adversary’s Sensor Gain
In this section, we discuss how to estimate the adver-
sary’s sensor observation kernel B in (1) which quantifies
the accuracy of the adversary’s sensors. We assume
that B is parameterized by an M-dimensional vector
θ ∈ Θ where Θ is a compact subset of IRM . Denote
the parameterized observation kernel as Bθ . Assume
that both us and the adversary know P (state transition
kernel5) and G (probabilistic map from adversary’s belief
to its action). Then given our state sequence x0:N and
adversary’s action sequence a1:N , our aim is to compute
the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ . That is,
with LN(θ) denoting the log likelihood, the aim is to
compute
θ ∗ = argmax
θ∈Θ
LN(θ), LN(θ) = log p(x0:N ,a1:N |θ).
The likelihood can be evaluated from the un-normalized
inverse filtering recursion (3)
LN(θ) = log
∫
Π
qθN(pi)dpi,
qθk+1(pi) = Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bθxk+1,yθpik ,pi
qθk (pik)dpik (12)
Given (12), a local stationary point of the likelihood
can be computed using a general purpose numerical
optimization algorithm.
D. Example. Estimating Adversary’s Gain in Linear
Gaussian case
The aim of this section is to provide insight into the
nature of estimating the adversary’s sensor gain via nu-
merical examples. Consider the setup in Sec.II-B where
our dynamics are linear Gaussian and the adversary
observes our state linearly in Gaussian noise (4). The
5As mentioned earlier, otherwise the adversary estimates P as Pˆ
and we need to estimate the adversary’s estimate as ˆˆP. This makes the
estimation task substantially more complex.
adversary estimates our state using a Kalman filter, and
we estimate the adversary’s estimate using the inverse
Kalman filter (9). Using (9), (10), the log likelihood for
the adversary’s observation gain matrix α =C based on
our measurements is
LN(θ) = const− 12
N
∑
k=1
log |S¯αk |−
1
2
N
∑
k=1
ι ′k (S¯
α
k )
−1 ιk
ιk = ak−C¯αk A¯αk−1 ˆˆxk−1− F¯αk−1xk−1 (13)
where ιk are the innovations of the inverse Kalman
filter (11). In (13), our state xk−1 is known to us and
therefore is a known exogenous input. Also note from
(10) that A¯k, F¯k are explicit functions of C, while C¯k and
Q¯k depend on C via the adversary’s Kalman filter.
The log likelihood for the adversary’s observation gain
matrix α = C can be evaluated using (12). To provide
insight, Figure 3 displays the log-likelihood versus ad-
versary’s gain matrix C in the scalar case for 1000 data
points. The four sub-figures correspond to true values of
Co = 2.5,3.5 respectively.
Each sub-figure in Figure 3 has two plots. The plot in
red is the log-likelihood of Cˆ∈ (0,10] evaluated based on
the adversary’s observations using the standard Kalman
filter. (This is the classical log-likelihood of the observa-
tion gain of a Gaussian state space model.) The plot in
blue is the log-likelihood of C ∈ (0,10] computed using
our measurements of the adversary’s action using the
inverse Kalman filter (where the adversary first estimates
our state using a Kalman filter) - we call this the inverse
case.
Figure 3 shows that the log likelihood in the inverse case
(blue plots) has a less pronounced maximum compared
to the standard case (red plots). Therefore, numerical
algorithms for computing the MLE of the adversary’s
gain Co using our observations of the adversary’s actions
(via the inverse Kalman filter) will converge much more
slowly than the classical MLE (based on the adversary’s
observations). This is intuitive since our estimate of
the adversary’s parameter is based on the adversary’s
estimate of our state and so has more noise.
Cramer Rao (CR) bounds. Is it instructive to com-
pare the CR bounds for MLE of C for the classic
model versus that of the inverse Kalman filter model.
Table I displays the CR bounds (reciprocal of expected
Fisher information) for the four examples considered
above evaluated using via the algorithm in [9]. It shows
that the covariance lower bound for the inverse case
is substantially higher than that for the classic case.
This is consistent with the intuition that estimating the
adversary’s parameter based on its actions (which is
based on its estimate of us) is more difficult than directly
estimating C in a classical state space model based on
the adversary’s observations of our state that determines
6Fig. 3: Log-Likelihood as a function of adversary’s
gain C ∈ (0,10] when true value is Co. The red curves
denote the log-likelihood of C given the adversary’s
measurements of our state. The blue curves denotes the
log-likelihood of C using the inverse Kalman filter given
our observations of the adversary’s action. The plots
show that it is more difficult to compute the MLE for the
inverse filtering problem due to the almost flat likelihood
(blue curves) compared to red curves.
Co Classic Inverse
0.5 0.24×10−3 5.3×10−3
1.5 1.2×10−3 37×10−3
2 2.1×10−3 70×10−3
3 4.6×10−3 336×10−3
TABLE I: Comparison of Cramer Rao bounds for C -
classical model vs inverse Kalman filter model
its actions.
Remarks:
1) Consistency of MLE. The above example shows that
the likelihood surface of LN(θ)= log p(x0:N ,a1:N |θ)
is flat and hence computing the MLE numerically
can be difficult. Even in the case when we observe
the adversary’s actions perfectly, our NIPS paper
[30] shows that non-trivial observability conditions
need to be imposed on the system parameters.
For the linear Gaussian case where we observe the
adversary’s Kalman filter in noise, strong consis-
tency of the MLE for the adversary’s gain matrix C
fairly straightforwardly. Specifically, if we assume
that state matrix A is stable, and the state space
model is an identifiable minimal realization, then
the adversary’s Kalman filter variables converge
to steady state values geometrically fast in k [3]
implying that asymptotically the inverse Kalman
filter system is stable linear time invariant. Then ,
the MLE θ ∗ for the adversary’s observation matrix
C is unique and a strongly consistent estimator [6].
2) Estimating the adversary’s estimate of our dynam-
ics (transition matrix) It is of interest to develop
algorithms to estimate the adversary’s estimate of
our transition matrix and analyze their performance.
The adversary estimates P as Pˆ and we need to
estimate the adversary’s estimate as ˆˆP. In future
work we will examine conditions under which the
MLE is identifiable and consistent.
III. IDENTIFYING UTILITY MAXIMIZATION IN A
COGNITIVE RADAR
The previous section was concerned with estimating the
adversary’s posterior belief and sensor accuracy. This
section discusses detecting utility maximization behavior
and estimating the adversary’s utility function in the
context of cognitive radars. As described in the introduc-
tion, inverse tracking, identifying utility maximization
and designing interference to confuse the radar constitute
our adversarial setting.
Cognitive radars [17] use the perception-action cycle of
cognition to sense the environment and learn from it
relevant information about the target and the environ-
ment. The cognitive radars then tune the radar sensor
to optimally satisfy their mission objectives. Based on
its tracked estimates, the cognitive radar adaptively opti-
mizes its waveform, aperture, dwell time and revisit rate.
In other words, a cognitive radar is a constrained utility
maximizer.
This section is motivated by the next logical step,
namely, identifying a cognitive radar from the actions
of the radar. The adversary cognitive radar observes
our state in noise; it uses a Bayesian estimator (target
tracking algorithm) to update its posterior distribution
of our state and then chooses an action based on this
posterior. From the intercepted emissions of an adver-
sary’s radar, we address the following question: Are the
adversary sensor’s actions consistent with optimizing a
monotone utility function (i.e., is the cognitive sensor
behavior rational in an economics sense)? If so how can
we estimate a utility function of the adversary’s cognitive
sensor that is consistent with its actions? The main syn-
thesis/analysis framework we will use is that of revealed
preferences [36], [14], [12] from microeconomics which
aims to determine preferences by observing choices.
The results presented below are developed in detail in
our recent paper [23]; however, the SINR constraint
formulation below for detecting waveform optimization
is new.
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Fig. 4: Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem. Our side is a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal that probes
the adversary’s cognitive radar system. k denotes a fast time scale and n denotes a slow time scale. Our state
xk, parameterized by αn (purposeful acceleration maneuvers), probes the adversary radar. Based on the noisy
observation yk of our state, the adversary radar responds with action βn. Our aim is to determine if the adversary
radar is economic rational, i.e., is its response βn generated by constrained optimizing a utility function?
A. Background. Revealed Preferences and Afriat’s The-
orem
Non-parametric detection of utility maximization behav-
ior is studied in the area of revealed preferences in
microeconomics. A key result is the following:
Definition III.1 ([1], [2]). A system is a utility maxi-
mizer if for every probe αn ∈ IRm+, the response βn ∈ IRm
satisfies
βn ∈ argmax
α ′nβ≤1
U(β ) (14)
where U(β ) is a monotone utility function.
In economics, αn is the price vector and βn the consump-
tion vector. Then α ′nβ ≤ 1 is a natural budget constraint6
for a consumer with 1 dollar. Given a dataset of price
and consumption vectors, the aim is to determine if the
consumer is a utility maximizer (rational) in the sense
of (14).
The key result is the following theorem due to
Afriat [12], [2], [1], [36], [34]
Theorem III.2 (Afriat’s Theorem [1]). Given a data
set D = {(αn,βn),n∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}}, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
1) The system is a utility maximizer and there exists a
monotonically increasing, continuous, and concave
utility function that satisfies (14).
2) For ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities
has a feasible solution:
us−ut −λtα ′t (βs−βt)≤ 0 ∀t,s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}.
(15)
6The budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 is without loss of generality, and
can be replaced by α ′nβ ≤ c for any positive constant c. A more general
nonlinear budget incorporating spectral constraints will be discussed
below.
3) Explicit monotone and concave utility functions7
that rationalize the dataset by satisfying (14) are
given by:
U(β ) = min
t∈{1,2,...,N}
{ut +λtα ′t (β −βt)} (16)
where ut and λt satisfy the linear inequalities (15).
4) The data set D satisfies the Generalized Ax-
iom of Revealed Preference (GARP) also called
cyclic consistency, namely for any t ≤ N, α ′tβt ≥
α ′tβt+1 ∀t ≤ k−1 =⇒ α ′kβk ≤ α ′kβ1.
Afriat’s theorem tests for economics-based rationality;
its remarkable property is that it gives a necessary
and sufficient condition for a system to be a utility
maximizer based on the system’s input-output response.
The feasibility of the set of inequalities (15) can be
checked using a linear programming solver; alternatively
GARP can be checked using Warshall’s algorithm with
O(N3) computations [35], [33].
The recovered utility using (16) is not unique; indeed any
positive monotone increasing transformation of (16) also
satisfies Afriat’s Theorem; that is, the utility function
constructed is ordinal. This is the reason why the budget
constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 is without generality; it can be scaled
by an arbitrary positive constant and Theorem III.2 still
holds. In signal processing terminology, Afriat’s Theo-
rem can be viewed as set-valued system identification of
an argmax system; set-valued since (16) yields a set of
utility functions that rationalize the finite dataset D .
7As pointed out in [33], a remarkable feature of Afriat’s theorem is
that if the dataset can be rationalized by a monotone utility function,
then it can be rationalized by a continuous, concave, monotonic utility
function. Put another way, continuity and concavity cannot be refuted
with a finite datasaset.
8B. Beam Allocation: Revealed Preference Test
This section constructs a test to identify a cognitive
radar that switches its beam adaptively between targets.
This example is based on [23] and is presented here
for completeness. The setup is schematically shown in
Figure 4. We view each component i of the probe
signal αn(i) as the trace of the precision matrix (inverse
covariance) of target i. We use the trace of the precision
of each target in our probe signal – this allows us to
consider multiple targets.
Suppose a radar adaptively switches its beam between
m targets where these m targets are controlled by us. As
in (4), on the fast time scale indexed by k, each target
i has linear Gaussian dynamics and the adversary radar
obtains linear Gaussian measurements:
xik+1 = Ax
i
k +w
i
k, x0 ∼ pi0
yik =C x
i
k + v
i
k, i = 1,2, . . . ,m
(17)
Here wik ∼ N(0,Qn(i)), vik ∼ N(0,Rn(i)), where N(µ,C)
denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and covari-
ance matrix C. We assume that both Qn(i) and Rn(i) are
known to us and the adversary.
As in previous sections, n indexes the epoch (slow time
scale) and k indexes the fast time scale within the epoch.
The adversary’s radar tracks our m targets using Kalman
filter trackers. The fraction of time the radar allocates to
each target i in epoch n is βn(i). The price the radar pays
for each target i at the beginning of epoch n is the trace
of the predicted precision of target i. Recall that this is
the trace of the inverse of the predicted covariance at
epoch n using the Kalman predictor
αn(i) = Tr(Σ−1n|n−1(i)), i = 1, . . . ,m (18)
The predicted covariance Σn|n−1(i) is a deterministic
function of the maneuver covariance Qn(i) of target i.
So the probe αn(i) is a signal that we can choose, since
it is a deterministic function of the maneuver covariance
Qn(i) of target i. We abstract the target’s covariance by
its trace denoted by αn(i). Note also that the observation
noise covariance Rin depends on the adversary’s radar
response βn(i), i.e., the fraction of time allocated to
target i. We assume that each target i can estimate the
fraction of time βn(i) the adversary’s radar allocates to
it using a radar detector.
Given the time series αn,βn, n = 1, . . . ,N, our aim is to
detect if the adversary’s radar is cognitive. We assume
that a cognitive radar optimizes its beam allocation as
the following constrained optimization:
βn = argmax
β
U(β )
s.t. β ′αn ≤ p∗,
(19)
where U(·) is the adversary radar’s utility function
(unknown to us) and p∗ ∈ IR+ is a pre-specified average
precision of all m targets.
The economics-based rationale for the budget constraint
is natural: For targets that are cheaper (lower precision
αn(i)), the radar has incentive to devote more time βn(i).
However, given its resource constraints, the radar can
achieve at most an average precision of p∗ over all
targets.
The setup in (19) is directly amenable to Afriat’s The-
orem III.2. Thus (15) can be used to test if the radar
satisfies utility maximization in its beam scheduling
(19) and also estimate the set of utility functions (16).
Furthermore (as in Afriat’s theorem) since the utility is
ordinal, p∗ can be chosen as 1 without loss of generality
(and therefore does not need to be known by us).
C. Waveform adaptation: Revealed Preference Test for
Non-linear budgets
In the previous subsection, we tested for cognitivity of
a radar by viewing it as an abstract system that switches
its beam adaptively between targets. Here, we discuss
cognitivity with respect to waveform design. Specifically,
we construct a test to identify cognitive behavior of
an adversary radar that optimizes its waveform based
on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of
the target measurement. By using a generalization of
Afriat’s theorem (Theorem III.2) to non-linear budgets,
our main aim is to detect if a radar intelligently chooses
its waveform to maximize an underlying utility subject
to signal processing constraints. Our setup below is
different to [23] since we introduce the SINR as a
nonlinear budget constraint; in comparison [23] uses a
spectral budget constraint.
We start by briefly outlining the generalized utility
maximization setup.
Definition III.3 ([14]). A system is a generalized utility
maximizer if for every probe αn ∈ IRm+, the response βn ∈
IRm satisfies
βn ∈ argmax
gn(β )≤0
U(β ) (20)
where U(β ) is a monotone utility function and gn(·) is
monotonically increasing in β .
The above utility maximization model generalizes Def-
inition III.1 since the budget constraint gn(β ) can ac-
commodate non-linear budgets and includes the linear
budget constraint of Definition III.1 as a special case.
The result below provides an explicit test for a system
that maximizes utility in the sense of Definition III.3 and
constructs a set of utility functions that rationalizes the
decisions βn of the utility maximizer.
9Theorem III.4 (Test for rationality with nonlinear bud-
get [14]). Let Bn = {β ∈ IRm+|gn(β )≤ 0} with gn : IRm→
IR an increasing, continuous function and gn(βn) = 0 for
n = 1, . . .N. Then the following conditions are equiva-
lent:
1) There exists a monotone continuous utility function
U that rationalizes the data set {βn,Bn},n= 1, . . .N.
That is
βn = argmax
β
U(β ), gn(β )≤ 0
2) The data set {βn,Bn},n = 1, . . . ,N satisfies GARP:
gt(β j)≤ gt(βt) =⇒ g j(βt)≥ 0 (21)
3) For ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities has
a feasible solution:
us−ut −λtgt(βs)≤ 0 ∀t,s ∈ {1,2, . . .N} (22)
4) With ut and λt defined in (22), an explicit monotone
continuous utility function that rationalizes the data
set is given by:
U(β ) = min
t∈{1,...N}
{ut +λtgt(β )} (23)
Like Afriat’s theorem, the above result provides a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for a system to be a utility
maximizer based on the system’s input-output response.
In spite of a non-linear budget constraint, it can be easily
verified that the constructed utility function U(β ) (23)
is ordinal since any positive monotone increasing trans-
formation of (23) satisfies the GARP inequalities (21).
We now justify the non-linear budget constraint in (20)
in the context of the cognitive radar by formulating
an optimization problem the radar solves equivalent to
Definition III.3. Suppose we observe the radar over
n= 1,2, . . . ,N time epochs (slow varying time scale). At
the nth epoch, we probe the radar with an interference
vector αn ∈ IRM . The radar responds with waveform
βn ∈ IRM+ . We assume the chosen waveform βn maximizes
the radar’s underlying utility function while ensuring
the radar’s signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
ratio exceeds a particular threshold δ . Formally put, the
radar’s response βn,n = 1,2 . . . is the solution of the
following constrained optimization problem.
βn ∈ argmax
β
U(β )
s.t. SINR(αn,β )≥ δ , (24)
SINR(α,β ) =
β ′Qβ
β ′P(α)β + γ
In (24), the radar’s signal and interference power are
assumed to be quadratic forms of Q,P(αn) respectively,
where Q,P(αn) ∈ IRM×M are positive definite matrices
known to us. The term γ > 0 is the noise power. The
SINR in (24) is a more general formulation of the
SCNR (29) of a cognitive radar derived in Sec. IV using
clutter response models [15]. The matrices Q,P(αn) are
analogous to the channel impulse response matrices Ht(·)
and Hp(·) corresponding to the target and clutter (inter-
ference) resulting from external interference at the nth
epoch, respectively (see Sec. IV-A for a discussion).
Clearly, the setup in (24) falls under the non-linear utility
maximization setup in Definition III.3 by defining the
non-linear budget gn(·) as gn(β ) = δ−SIR(αn,β ) where
SIR(·) is defined in (24). It only remains to show that
this definition of gn(β ) is monotonically increasing in
β . Theorem III.5 stated below establishes two condi-
tions that are sufficient for gn(β ) to be monotonically
increasing in β .
Theorem III.5. If the adversary radar uses SINR con-
straint (24), then the following two conditions need to
hold so that the function gn(β ) = δ − SIR(αn,β ) is
monotonically increasing in the radar response β .
1) The matrix Q is a diagonal matrix with off-diagonal
elements equal to zero.
2) The matrix
(
cP(αn)
dQ
P(αn)−Q
)
is component-wise
less than 0 for all n∈ {1,2, . . .N}, where cP(αn) > 0
and dQ > 0 denote the smallest and largest eigen
values of P(αn) and Q respectively.
Then Theorem III.4 can be used as a constructive pro-
cedure to identify constrained utility maximization (with
SINR constraint) and construct a utility function U(β )
that rationalizes the actions of the adversary radar.
The proof follows from elementary calculus and omitted
for brevity. Hence, assuming the two conditions hold in
Theorem III.5 above, we can use the results from Theo-
rem III.4 to test if the radar satisfies utility maximization
in its waveform scheduling (24) and also estimate the set
of feasible utility functions U(·) (24) that rationalizes the
radar’s responses {βn}.
IV. DESIGNING SMART INTERFERENCE TO CONFUSE
COGNITIVE RADAR
This section discusses how we can engineer external
interference (a probing signal) at the physical layer
level to confuse a cognitive radar. By abstracting the
probing signal to a channel in the frequency domain,
our objective is to minimize the signal power of the
interference generated by us while ensuring the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise (SCNR) ratio of the radar
does not exceed a pre-defined threshold. The setup is
schematically shown in Figure 5. Note that the level of
abstraction used in this section is at the Wiener filter
pulse/waveform level; whereas the previous two sections
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Fig. 5: Schematic of transmit channel Ht , clutter channel Hc and interference channel P involving an adversarial
cognitive radar and us. We observe the radar’s waveform W in noise. The aim is to engineer the interference channel
P to confuse the cognitive radar.
were at the systems level and tracker level, respectively.
This is consistent with the design theme of sense globally
(high level of abstraction) and act locally (lower level of
abstraction).
As can be seen in the SCNR expression in (29), the
interference signal power manifests as additional clutter
perceived by the radar in the denominator thus forcing
the SCNR to go down. The radar then re-designs its
waveform to maximize its SCNR given our interference
signal. We observe the radar’s chosen waveform in noise.
Our task can thus be re-formulated as choosing the
interference signal with minimal power while ensuring
that with probability atleast 1− ε , the optimized SCNR
lies below a threshold level δ (ε,δ are user-defined quan-
tities). This approach closely follows the formulation in
Sec. III-C where the cognitive radar chooses the optimal
waveform while ensuring the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio SINR exceeds a threshold value.
A. Interference Signal Model
We first characterize how a cognitive radar optimally
chooses its waveform based on its perceived interfer-
ence. The radar’s objective is to choose the optimal
waveform that maximizes its signal-to-interference-plus-
noise (SINR) ratio.
Suppose we observe the radar over l = 1,2 . . .L pulses,
where each pulse comprises n = 1,2, . . .N discrete time
steps. A single-input single-output (SISO) radar system
has two channel impulse responses, one for the target and
the other for clutter. Let w(n) denote the radar transmit
waveform and ht(n), hc(n) denote the target and clutter
channel impulse responses, respectively. Then, the radar
measurements corresponding to the l-th pulse can be
expressed as
x(n, l) = ht(n, l)~w(n, l)+hc(n, l)~w(n, l)+ er(n, l)
(25)
where ~ represents a convolution operator and er(n, l)
is the radar measurement noise modeled as an i.i.d
random variable with zero mean and known variance σ2r .
We model the radar’s measurement using the stochastic
Green’s function impulse response model presented in
[15], where the radar’s electromagnetic channel is mod-
eled using a physics based impulse response.
Since convolution in the time domain can be expressed
as multiplication in the frequency domain (with notation
in upper case), we can express the measurements in the
frequency domain as follows:
X(k, l) = Ht(k, l)W (k, l)+Hc(k, l)W (k, l)+Er(k, l)
(26)
where k ∈K = {1, . . . ,K} is the frequency bin index.
Eq. (26) can be extended to an I× J MIMO radar and
the received signal at the j-th receiver can be given by
X j(k, l) =
I
∑
i=1
(
Hti j(k, l)Wi(k, l)+
Hci j(k, l)Wi(k, l)+Er, j(k, l)
)
∀k ∈ {1, . . .K}. (27)
Using matrices and vectors obtained by stacking and
concatenating (27) for all i ∈ {1, . . . I}, j ∈ {1, . . .J} and
k ∈K , the MIMO radar measurement model at the lth
pulse in vector-matrix form can be expressed as
X (l) =H t(l)W (l)+H c(l)W (l)+E r(l) (28)
where X (l) ∈ C(J×K)×1 is the received signal vector,
H c(l),H t(l) ∈ C(J×K)×(I×J×K) are the effective trans-
mit and clutter channel impulse matrices respectively,
W (l) ∈ C(I×J×K)×1 is the radar’s effective waveform
vector. E r(l) ∈ C(J×K)×1 is the effective additive noise
vector modeled as a zero mean i.i.d random variable
(independent over pulses) with covariance matrix Cr ∈
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R(J×K)×(J×K),C = (σ2r /K)I = σ˜2r I, where I denotes the
identity matrix. The block diagram in Fig. 5 shows the
entire procedure for this model.
B. Engineered Interference for confusing the radar
The aim of this section is to design optimal interfer-
ence signals (to confuse the adversary cognitive radar)
by solving a probabilistically constrained optimization
problem.
At the beginning of the lth pulse, the adversary radar
transmits a pilot signal to estimate the transmit and
clutter channel impulse responses H t(l) and H c(l) re-
spectively. Assuming it has a perfect estimate of H t(l)
and H c(l), the radar then chooses the optimal waveform
W ∗(l) such that signal-to-clutter-plus-noise (SCNR) ratio
defined below in (29) is maximized. The radar’s wave-
form W ∗(l) is the solution to the following optimization
problem
W ∗(l) = argmax
W (l):‖W (l)‖2=1
SCNR(H t(l),H c(l),W (l))
= argmax
W (l):‖W (l)‖2=1
E
{wwH t(l)W (l)ww22}
E
{wwH c(l)W (l)+E r(l)ww22} .
(29)
Denote the maximum SCNR achieved in (29) as
SCNRmax(H t(l),H c(l)) = SCNR(H t(l),H c(l),W ∗(l)).
(30)
Given H t(l),H c(l) and the radar’s measurement noise
power σ2r , the radar generates an optimal waveform at
the lth pulse using (29) as the solution to the following
eigenvector problem [5]:
A W ?(l) = λlW ?(l)
A =
((
H c(l)′H c(l)+ σ˜2r I
)−1H t(l)′H t(l)),
Here (·)′ denotes the Hermitian transpose operator.
As an external observer, we send a sequence of probe
signals P = {H p(l), l ∈ {1,2, . . .L}} over L pulses to
confuse the adversary radar and degrade its performance.
The interference signal H p(l−1) at the (l−1)th affects
only radar’s clutter channel impulse response H c(l) at
the lth pulse which subsequently results in change of
optimal waveform (29) chosen by the radar W ∗(l). We
measure the optimal waveform at the lth pulse in noise as
Y (l). We assume constant transmit and clutter channel
impulse responses H t ,H c in the absence of the probe
signals P. The dynamics of our interaction with the
adversary radar due to probe P are as follows:
H c(l) =H c+H p(l−1) (31)
H t(l) =H t (32)((
H c(l)′H c(l)+ σ˜2r I
)−1H t(l)′H t(l))W (l)
= λlW (l) (33)
Y (l) =W (l)+E o(l). (34)
In (34), Eo(l) is our measurement noise modeled as
a zero mean i.i.d random variable (independent over
pulses) sampled from a known pdf fo with covariance
matrix Co = (σ2o /K)I = σ˜2o I.
Fig. 6: Schematic of engineered interference to confuse
the cognitive radar. The interference signal at the lth
pulse affects the waveform choice of the radar in the
(l+1)th pulse. We record the noisy waveform measure-
ment Y (l + 1) and generate the interference signal for
the (l+2)th pulse.
Our objective is to optimally design the probe signals
P∗ = {H ∗p(l), l ∈ {1, . . .L}} that minimizes the interfer-
ence signal power such that the probability the SCNR of
the radar lies below a threshold δ exceeds (1− ε), for
all l = 1,2, . . .L and pre-defined values δ > 0, ε ∈ [0,1).
min
{H p(l),l∈{1,2,...L}}
L
∑
l=1
H p(l)′H p(l)
s.t. P fo(SCNRmax(H t(l),H c(l),σ
2
e )≤ δ )≥ 1− ε,
∀l ∈ {2,3, . . .L}. (35)
Although not explicitly shown, the SCNRmax expression
in (35) does depend on our interference signal H p as
depicted in (31).
Solving the above non-convex optimization problem is
challenging except for trivial cases and is a subject of on-
going research. It involves two inter-related components
(i) Estimating the transmit and clutter channel impulse
responses H t ,H c from observation Y (l) and (ii) Using
the estimated value of channel impulse responses to
generate the interference signal H p(l). Moreover, solving
for H c and H t from recursive equations (31) through
(34) for l = 1, . . . ,L is a challenging problem since it
does not have an analytical closed form solution. We
can start with a simple scenario such as SISO radar case
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with a simple receive filter R = [1, . . . ,1]. This makes
the problem more tractable because the matrix of the
left side of (33) becomes a rank-one matrix in this case.
We can also assume that we have an access to the signal
coming through the target and clutter from the cognitive
radar, which means we have more information about H t
and H c.
The cognitive radar maximizes its energy in the direction
of its target impulse response and transfer function. As
soon as we have an accurate estimate of the target
channel transfer function from the L pulses, we can
immediately generate signal dependent interference that
nulls the target returns. Even if the clutter channel
impulse response changes after we perform our estima-
tion, since the target channel is stationary for longer
durations, the signal dependent interference will work
successfully for several pulses after we conclude the
estimate. The main take away from this approach is
that we are exploiting the fact that the cognitive radar
provides information about its channel by optimizing
the waveform with respect to its environment. Recall
that detecting this optimization behavior can be achieved
using the revealed preference framework in Sec. III-C.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper considered three important inter-related as-
pects of adversarial inference involving cognitive radars.
First we discussed inverse tracking (estimating the adver-
sary tracker’s estimate based on the radar’s actions) and
calibration of the adversary’s sensor accuracy. Then we
presented a revealed preferences methodology for iden-
tifying cognitive radars; i.e., identifying a constrained
utility maximizer. Finally, we discussed designing in-
terference to confuse the cognitive radar. The above
three aspects are inter-related as depicted in Figure 1.
The levels of abstraction range from smart interference
design based on Wiener filters (at the pulse/waveform
level), inverse Kalman filters at the tracking level and
revealed preferences for identifying utility maximization
at the systems level.
Extensions
The results in this paper lead to several interesting future
extensions. There is strong motivation to determine an-
alytic performance bounds for inverse tracking/filtering
and estimation of the adversary’s sensor gain. Another
aspect (not considered here) is when the adversary does
not know the transition kernel of our dynamics; the
adversary then needs to estimate this transition kernel,
and we need to estimate the estimate of this transition
kernel.
Regarding identifying cognitive radars, the natural ex-
tension is to a Bayesian context, namely, identifying a
radar that is a Bayesian utility maximizer. We refer to [7]
for seminal work in this area stemming from behavioral
economics.
Finally, in the design of controlled inference, it is worth-
while considering a game-theoretic setting where the
cognitive radar (adversary) and us interact dynamically.
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